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Abstract
There is a large and continuously expanding literature on the relationship between trade openness 
and welfare effort. The most nuanced accounts ﬁnd that it depends on the type of openness 
(low-wage or inter-industry trade) and welfare (e.g. unemployment assistance or health-care) 
whether there is tension, harmony or no relation at all between openness and welfare effort. This 
paper contributes to this literature by assessing to what extent the effect of trade varies across 
the different welfare state regimes – liberal, conservative and social democratic. Such variation 
seems likely given that these regimes’ characteristics differ. Using a broad range of empirical 
material for fourteen advanced capitalist democracies over, espe-cially, the period 1980–1998, 
this study demonstrated that there are important cross-regime differences in different types 
of trade openness and the priority of welfare programmes. These ﬁndings indicate that the 
assumption that the impact of trade openness is similar across countries – an assumption that 
underlies many studies that look into the openness–welfare effort relationship –, leads to 
conclusions on the openness–welfare relationship that are off beam. 
An earlier version of this paper was prepared for the “Varieties of Capitalism” course at the Oslo Summer School 
in Comparative Social Science Studies, University of Oslo, Norway, August 2004
The author would like to thank Lars Mjøset, Hans Keman, Arjan Vliegenthart and Andreas Nölke for helpful 
comments.
11 Introduction
There is a large and continuously expanding literature on the relationship between economic 
openness and welfare effort. After almost twenty-ﬁve year of comparative research the exact 
nature of this relationship is still unclear. More speciﬁcally, three perspectives with contradictory 
ﬁndings stand abreast. The ﬁrst perspective argues that economic openness and welfare effort 
are mutually reinforcing because the compensation that society demands for the larger risks in 
an (more) open economy is subsequently provided by governments (e.g. Cameron 1978; Garrett 
1998). The second perspective states that although openness and welfare might once have been 
mutually reinforcing, they are currently in tension since the aggregate gains from trade are offset 
by micro-level losses such as increased insecurity, volatility and dislocation. Simultaneously, 
political and economic constraints like the limited ﬁscal and monetary autonomy inhibit 
governments to accommodate the prompted political demands (e.g. Kapstein 1996; Strange 
1996; Rodrik 1997; 1998; Garrett and Mitchell 2001). Finally, the third perspective argues 
that the effect of economic openness on welfare is small, at most, because – since economic 
openness hardly increased over time –, the threats of openness are exaggerated (e.g. Iversen and 
Cusack 2000), or the relationship between openness and welfare is mediated by political and 
institutional conditions (e.g. Pierson 1996). 
Clashing as these perspectives may seem, Burgoon (2001: 510) demonstrates that they 
are all to some extent right if ‘(…) the nature of openness, welfare effort, and the politics 
connecting them’ is taken into account. Dependent on the type of openness and welfare, there 
is tension, harmony or no relation at all (idem: 546). There are, at least, three reasons why the 
above perspectives come to different conclusions.
First, most studies use an aggregate measure of openness such as import plus export as a 
share of gross domestic product. This is problematic because economic theory suggests that the 
effect of openness on economic risks varies across types of openness and that the consequent 
compensation demanded varies as well. More precisely, new trade theory (Krugman 1992; 
1995) proposes the so-called smooth adjustment hypothesis that informs us that the labour 
market adjustment costs such as job losses or the need for workers to relocate or retrain are 
substantially smaller under so-called intra-industry trade than under inter-industry trade (see e.g. 
Balassa 1966). Intra-industry trade is trade that is caused by increasing product differentiation 
with scale economies (Lee 2004: 6), which means that it is basically trade between developed 
countries, for example German shoes for Italian suits. Inter-industry trade, also known as low-
wage trade, is trade that is caused by changes in the pattern of comparative advantage (Lee 2004: 
6), which means that it is basically trade between developed and less-developed countries, for 
example Chinese textiles for Swiss watches. 
 Second, most studies take an aggregate measure of welfare such as total public or social 
expenditure as a share of gross or net domestic product. However, the demands for compensation 
by groups left vulnerable by greater openness and the responses of producers/investors likely 
vary across the different welfare policies. Burgoon (2001: 542), for example, found that low-
2wage trade positively and signiﬁcantly correlates with training and relocation spending and 
negatively and insigniﬁcantly with retirement and family assistance. These different effects 
would be lost if an aggregate measure of welfare was adopted instead.  
Third, most studies (implicitly) assume that the impact of trade openness is similar 
across countries. However, the welfare state literature informs us that it makes theoretical 
sense to distinguish different types of welfare state regimes – liberal, conservative or Christian-
democratic, and social democratic (see e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990; 1999; Pierson 2001: 428-
431). A welfare regime is a cluster of countries with distinct political and policy conﬁgurations 
that is hence expected to evolve along a distinct path. Consequently, and given the proposition 
that the effect of openness likely varies across welfare policies and given that the importance 
of speciﬁc welfare policies is regime-dependent, the effect of trade openness on welfare effort 
probably diverges across welfare regimes as well. 
This third reason for the clashing ﬁndings of the three welfare–openness perspectives 
is – contrary to the other two – not dealt with by Burgoon (2001). By posing the following 
question: To what extent varies the effect of trade openness across the different welfare state 
regimes?, this paper builds on and extends Burgoon’s ﬁndings. Answering the propound question 
further enhances the theorising on the relationship between trade openness and welfare effort. In 
addition, it contributes to the current discussion in Europe on the effects of economic openness 
and/or integration on the so-called European Social Model. This debate has intensiﬁed since 
the recent entry of the ten new European Union (EU) member-states. If the effect of openness 
varies across types of welfare states, this would mean that – because the (old) EU-countries 
belong to different types of welfare states – the effect of openness also varies within the EU. 
To study the trade openness-welfare effort relationship, I use a broad range of empirical 
material such as disaggregated data on social expenditure and trade openness for fourteen 
advanced capitalist democracies: four countries from the liberal regime (United Kingdom, 
Ireland, United States, Canada); six from the conservative regime (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Italy); and four from the social democratic regime (Denmark, Finland, 
Norway. Sweden). The data cover the period 1959–2000, concentrating on the period 1980–
1998. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section two sets out why regime-differences are 
important for the openness–welfare effort debate. Section three elaborates on the two types of 
trade openness, low-wage trade and intra-industry trade, and shows that the different welfare 
regimes display various levels of both types. Section four puts forward hypotheses on the effect 
of openness on welfare effort in the different welfare regimes. Section ﬁve assesses the empirical 
validity of these hypotheses. Section six is the conclusion. 
2 Varieties of welfare capitalism: differences matter
The most widely used categorisation of welfare state types is the aforementioned identiﬁcation 
by Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999) of a liberal, a conservative and a social democratic regime. 
3The liberal regime is characterised by its residual social policy and encouragement of, and 
fate in, the market; the conservative regime by its institutionalised family-income, earnings-
based insurance model and widespread use of labour-supply reducing measures such as early 
retirement; and the social democratic regime by its universal coverage in a generous social 
security system in which supply-side policies have a central position (see for more extensive 
discussions for example  Castles 1993; Pierson 2001; Esping-Andersen 2002). Esping-
Andersen’s categorisation builds on the classical categorisation of Titmuss (1974), whose 
‘residual’, ‘industrial achievement-performance’, and ‘institutional redistributive’ welfare states 
largely overlap the liberal, conservative, and social democratic regimes. This categorisation 
seems stable through time. In recent work, Castles (2004: 66-7) distinguishes three (largely) 
similar welfare state regimes on the basis of their expenditure proﬁles, namely a continental 
Western Europe ‘social security state’ of which Southern Europe is a sub-type, an English-
speaking ‘poverty alleviation’ state, and a Scandinavian ‘state services state’. Not only does the 
categorisation hold through time, it also becomes stronger since the last two decades display 
substantial intra-type convergence (Castles 2004).
These different regimes vary in terms of decommodiﬁcation, i.e. the extent to which 
citizens are relatively independent ‘from pure market forces’ (Esping-Andersen 2000: 353), the 
present social security rights, the extent of stratiﬁcation as well as in their emphasis on the market, 
state, and family (Esping-Andersen 1999). Partly as a consequence, their politico-institutional 
conﬁgurations vary (Ferrera and Hemerijck 2003). This indicates that although some of the 
problems countries face and the solutions they provide stem from the speciﬁcs of their political 
economies, at least part of these responses are determined by the shared characteristics that are 
typical for a particular type of welfare state. The large scale comparative project that Scharpf 
and Schmidt directed, empirically corroborates this proposition (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000). 
Given these variations, it also seems likely that the level and changes of trade openness 
varies across the welfare regimes. The post-war era until the 1970s indeed displays a clear 
pattern: the most advanced welfare states developed in the most open economies, whereas the 
more residual welfare states clustered in relatively protected countries. According to Esping-
Andersen (1996), the answer to this puzzle lies in the way domestic institutions facilitate, or not, 
broad consensual solutions. With the substantial increase in openness from the 1970s onwards 
(see section 3), lean welfare states and open economies were no longer mutually exclusive. 
Understanding the new pattern requires going beyond pure domestic explanations. Therefore, 
the next section analyzes the level and change of trade openness in the different types of welfare 
states.
3 Trade openness: low-wage versus intra-industry trade 
Do the different welfare state regimes display different levels of and changes in the two kinds 
of trade openness, low-wage trade and intra-industry trade? Recall that this is an important 
question because the effect of (further) trade openness on welfare effort likely varies across 
different types of openness. 
4Lets begin by establishing whether there has been a rise in trade openness in general, that 
is in openness conventionally measured as import plus export as a percentage of gross domestic 
product. Table 1 shows that this trade ratio increases in all countries of this paper (except for 
Norway)1 from 1970 onwards. More speciﬁcally, between 1980 and 1998, the liberal regime’s 
trade ratio rises by 37 per cent. The conservative trade ratio displays less increase, namely 16 
percent but at a level that was higher than the liberal regime in both years. The social democratic 
trade ratio, ﬁnally, increases by 7 per cent the least. Between 1990 and 1998, the ranking of 
changes was reshufﬂes somewhat: the liberal regime still displays the largest increase, namely 
37 per cent; the social democratic regime is second with a 18 per cent rise; and the conservative 
regime has with 10 per cent the smallest increase but is still the regime with the highest level of 
trade in both years. To some extent, the substantially larger increase in the liberal regime stems 
from the low level of trade in 1990, which is around the 1970-level of the other two regimes.
Table 1 Trade ratio in selected OECD countries, 1980-1998 a
1970 1980 1990 1998 ∆ 1980-1998
∆ 1990-
1998
United Kingdom 43.8 52.1 50.6 54.29 + 4% + 7%
Ireland 77.5 106.5 109.3 161.80 + 52% + 48%
United States 11.3 20.7 20.6 23.87 + 15% + 16%
Canada 42.6 54.6 54.9 81.54 + 49% + 49%
Average liberal regime 43.8 58.5 58.9 80.4 + 37% + 37%
Austria 59.6 73.9 78.0 87.66 + 19% + 12%
Belgium 100.9 117.7 137.7 146.09 + 24% + 6%
France 30.4 43.2 43.5 49.58 + 15% + 14%
Germany 39.1 51.7 54.3 56.56 + 9% + 4%
Netherlands 89.7 103.8 104.6 116.49 + 12% + 11%
Italy 32.1 46.1 39.4 49.36 + 7% + 25%
Average conservative regime 58.6 72.7 76.3 84.3 + 16% + 10%
Denmark 57.3 65.5 66.6 68.76 + 5% + 3%
Finland 51.0 65.5 47.2 68.76 + 5% + 46%
Norway 73.7 80.3 74.7 72.95 - 9% - 2%
Sweden 47.7 60.2 59.2 81.15 + 35% + 37%
Average social democratic regime 57.4 67.9 61.9 72.9 + 7% + 18%
a  Export plus import as percentage of gross domestic product in current prices.
Note: Increases in the average trade ratio of a welfare state regime are displayed in ‘bold’.
Source: Heston, Summers and Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for International Comparisons at the 
University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002; averages own calculations.
5The data in table 1 tell us that trade openness in general increased between 1970 and 1998, but 
does not differentiate between different types of trade openness. Table 2 shows data for our ﬁrst 
type of trade openness, intra-industry trade. The level of intra-industry trade is determined by 
the most widely used measure, the Grubel-Lloyd index (1975), which has a minimum of 0 if 
all trade in of the low-wage type, that is if all trade is between developed and less-developed 
countries, and a maximum of 100 if all trade is of the intra-industry type, that is if all trade is 
between developed countries. Although this sounds relatively simple, the level of intra-industry 
trade is in fact fairly difﬁcult to.2 Some authors, such as Marvel and Ray (1987) and Brülhart 
et al. (2004), maintain that the Grubel-Lloyd index does not adequately measure the level of 
intra-industry trade and suggest even more complex measurements (see also Lee 2004). For our 
purpose of comparing the levels of different types of trade openness across welfare regimes and 
across time, the Grubel-Lloyd index sufﬁces however. 
Table 2 Intra-industry trade in selected OECD countries, 1959-2000
1959 1964 1967 1988-1991
1992-
1995
1996-
2000
United Kingdom 32 40 69 70.1 73.1 73.7
Ireland .. .. .. 58.6 57.2 54.6
United States 40 40 49 63.5 65.3 68.5
Canada 28 35 48 73.5 74.7 76.2
Average liberal regime 33 38 55 66.4 67.6 68.3
Austria .. .. .. 71.8 74.3 74.2
Belgium a 53 60 63 77.6 77.7 71.4
France 45 60 65 75.9 77.6 77.5
Germany 39 42 46 67.1 72.0 72.0
Netherlands 55 58 56 69.2 70.4 68.9
Italy .. .. .. 61.6 64.0 65.7
Average conservative regime 48 55 58 70.5 72.7 71.6
Denmark .. .. .. 61.6 63.4 64.8
Finland .. .. .. 53.8 53.2 53.9
Norway .. .. .. 40.0 37.5 37.1
Sweden .. .. .. 64.2 64.6 66.6
Average social democratic regime .. .. .. 54.9 54.7 55.6
a For 1959, 1964 and 1967, plus Luxembourg.
Sources: Data for 1959, 1964 and 1967: Grubel and Lloyd (1975, table 3.5); data for 1988-1991, 1992-
1995 and 1996-2000: OECD (2002, table VI.I); averages own calculations.
6The variation across countries in the level of intra-industry trade is considerable, as table 2 
demonstrates. In addition, the upward trend in most countries supports Balassa’s ﬁnding of the 
prevalence of intra-industry specialisation under greater trade openness. Notwithstanding the 
individual countries’ variations, the patterns the welfare regimes display are fairly distinct. Over 
the entire period 1959–2000, the ranking of regimes in terms of intra-industry trade levels is 
stable: the conservative regime has the most intra-industry trade, the social democratic regime 
the least (although for the latter, no data are available before 1988). This stability in terms 
of intra-industry trade differs from the general openness measure. Regarding the latter, the 
conservative regime had the highest trade ratio over the period 1970–1998 but the liberal regime 
on the contrary had the lowest trade ratio until 1990 and had shifted to the middle position 
by 1998. This discrepancy is a ﬁrst indication that focusing on different types of openness is 
worthwhile.
The data in table 2 furthermore tell us that already in 1950, the conservative regime’s 
level of intra-industry trade was relatively high (48 per cent). By 1964, over 50 per cent of 
all trade was of the intra-industry type. The liberal regime only surpasses this 50 per cent 
‘threshold’ three years later but with a higher speed than in the conservative regime. From 1967 
onwards, there seems to be some convergence between the conservative and liberal regimes 
regarding levels of intra-industry trade. As stated, the social democratic regime is the intra-
industry trade laggard: from 1988 onwards, around 55 percent of all trade is intra-industry trade, 
with Denmark and Sweden having substantially more intra-industry trade (60 to 65 percent) 
than Finland (around 53 percent) and, especially, Norway (around 38 percent). 
Our second type of trade openness, low-wage trade, is the mirror image of the ﬁrst (Lee 
2004: 6), intra-industry trade so that an x percent level of intra-industry trade corresponds to 
a (1-x) level of low-wage trade. The analysis of low-wage trade in the three welfare regimes 
is hence analogous: the conservative regime displays the lowest low-wage trade; the social 
democratic regime the highest. A commonality between the regimes is the stable level of intra-
industry and low-wage trade from 1988 onwards. This indicates that if trade openness affects 
welfare programmes and politics in a certain way, this is likely to continue in the years to come. 
Because of the expected larger impact on welfare effort under low-wage trade, the material 
presented in this section suggests the largest impact of trade openness on welfare effort in the 
social democratic regime. 
4 Hypothesised effect of trade openness on welfare effort in the welfare regimes 
The previous section demonstrated that there are substantial differences in terms of trade 
openness between the welfare regimes. I argued that these differences likely lead to varying 
effects of trade openness on welfare effort across the welfare regimes.3 This section puts 
forwards hypotheses about the effects of greater trade openness on welfare effort in the different 
welfare regimes.
7Greater trade openness poses the highest risks to people that are low-skilled or own 
speciﬁc assets, the so-called vulnerable groups. When faced with greater trade openness, these 
groups will demand compensation. Such demands are probably more concentrated the closer 
a welfare programme is connected to the vulnerable groups’ direct and short-term needs that 
are caused by the risen openness. Active labour market programmes such as job training and 
relocation assistance, and passive labour market programmes such as unemployment assistance, 
directly address the needs of the vulnerable groups and are hence expected to be of high priority 
to them. Other programmes such as retirement assistance and health-care, only address the 
vulnerable groups’ needs indirectly or in the longer term and are consequently expected to be 
of low(er) priority to them. 
Similarly, the resistance to or acceptance of changes in social expenditure that greater 
openness elicits among internationalised investors and producers, is expected to vary across the 
different welfare programmes. As Burgoon (2001: 522) states, the demands for compensation 
are likely to be resisted more when the programmes asked to be expanded constitute the greatest 
burden on overall taxation or budgets. This suggests stronger resistance to pension and health-
care compensation than to active labour market programmes. Furthermore, because passive 
labour market programmes put a disproportional burden on investors and employers, these 
groups tend to be more hostile to passive labour market programmes than to other kinds of 
compensation. Moreover, new growth theory in economics informs us that some factors of the 
public economy are more conductive to the growth of total factor productivity – something 
producers and investors desire –, than others. So, trade openness is likely to inspire pressure 
from these groups to increased social expenditure on education, and job training and relocation 
assistance. Finally, some welfare programmes harm internationalised producers and investors 
in terms of productivity beneﬁts, namely health-care, retirement and family assistance, and 
these groups are therefore expected to oppose such compensation ﬁercely. 
These varying responses to greater openness should spark four different patterns of 
compensation politics and, hence, have varying implications for the different welfare programmes. 
Figure 1 displays the expected patterns. First, openness is expected to inspire harmonious, 
one-sided politics that expands welfare effort for welfare programmes that are subject to 
strong compensation demands and investor support or low opposition, such as job training and 
relocation assistance. Second, openness is expected to inspire one-sided politics that retrench 
welfare effort for welfare programmes that are diffusely connected to compensation demands 
and high investor and producer concern, like retirement assistance, health-care, and family 
assistance. Third, openness is expected to spark more conﬂictual politics with indeterminate 
outcomes for welfare programmes that are subject to strong compensation demands and high 
investor hostility, like unemployment assistance. Fourth, openness is expected to spur few 
political struggles and little change in welfare effort for welfare programmes that are remote 
from both compensation demands and investor fears, such as educational spending. 
8Figure 1 Support for or opposition to welfare compensation in the face of greater economic 
openness
Internationalized producer/investor stance of welfare 
compensation
SUPPORT OR LOW 
OPPOSITION
HIGH OPPOSITION
Demand of vulnerable
group for welfare
compensation
HIGH One-sided politics:
Welfare expansion
Job training and relocation 
assistance
Conﬂictual politics:
Indeterminate outcome
Unemployment assistance
LOW No politics:
Little change
General education
One-sided politics:
Welfare retrenchment
Health-care 
Retirement assistance
Family assistance
Source: Burgoon (2001).
These different patterns of compensation politics and welfare programmes clearly suggest that 
greater trade openness encourages larger changes in some welfare regimes than in others. The 
liberal regime’s priority to poverty alleviation and health-care, its almost absent job training 
and relocation programmes, its faith in and support of the market, and its high level of intra-
industry trade meaning relatively low adjustment costs and hence modest demands from 
vulnerable groups, lead to the hypothesis that the transformations in this regime caused by 
greater trade openness are modest, at most, and largely unproblematic politically. The social 
democratic regime’s priority on services including active labour market policies such as job 
training and relocation assistance – that have large political support because they include the 
middle class as Scharpf and Schmidt (2000) point out –, and its relative high level of low-wage 
trade indicating that the demands of vulnerable groups might be higher here than in the other 
regimes, suggest rises in expenditure on job training and relocation assistance and (a smaller) 
rise in unemployment assistance without much political upheaval. The conservative regime’s 
contribution based social security systems with low priority for job training and relocation 
assistance, its generous unemployment assistance for the ‘insiders’, and its ageing population 
indicate that the transformation caused by greater trade openness in this regime is probably 
most substantial of the three and accompanied by possibly severe political struggles. However, 
the level of low-wage trade in this regime is lowest, which means that the adjustment costs 
resulting from the need to accommodate the risks put forward by greater openness might not be 
that large and that, consequently, the changes in this regime might be modest as well. The next 
section assesses the empirical validity of these hypotheses.
95 The ﬁndings
There are various ways to measure welfare effort. As already noticed, by taking an aggregate 
measure of welfare effort, important information can get lost. Therefore, I use disaggregated data 
on social policy categories (OECD 1998; 2001). In an often-cited quote, Esping-Andersen (1990: 
19) states that ‘expenditures are epiphenomenal to the theoretical substance of welfare states’. 
However, Castles (2002: 616) argues that the disaggregated data from the OECD databases 
allow for the elaboration of expenditure measures that provide more nuanced information than 
before on the ‘character and trajectory of social policy change and reform’, which justiﬁes 
using them in this study. 
This paper focuses on six spending categories:4 1) total public expenditure; 2) job 
training and relocation assistance; 3) retirement assistance, measured by old-age cash, elderly 
and disabled assistance and survivor’s beneﬁts; 4) family assistance, measured by family cash 
and services; 5) health-care; and 6) unemployment, measured by unemployment compensation, 
early retirement for labour market reasons and severance pay. The appendix provides tables on 
these categories’ expenditures in 1980, 1990 and 1998; table 3 presents the changes in these 
expenditures between 1980–1998 and between 1990–1998;5 and table 4 presents the ranking of 
the changes in spending priorities across the regimes as well as across the different periods. 
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Table 4 Ranking of spending priorities’ changes in welfare regimes, 1980-1998 
Liberal regime Conservative regime Social democratic regime
1980-98 1990-98 1980-98 1990-98 1980-98 1990-98
Retirement 
(+ 28%) Retirement(+18%)
Job training
(+ 48%)
Family
(+ 20%)
Job training
(+ 104%)
Family 
(+ 30%)
Total 
(+ 17%) Health care (+ 6%)
Retirement
(+ 25%)
Retirement
(+ 17%)
Unempl
(+ 30%)
Job training 
(+ 16%)
Health care
(+ 7%) Total (+ 5%)
Unempl
(+ 20%)
Total
(+ 10%)
Total
(+ 21%)
Unempl
(+ 9%)
Family
(+ 2%) Unempl(- 43%)
Total 
(+ 20%)
Job training
(+ 9%)
Retirement
(+ 19%)
Retirement
(+ 2%)
Unempl
(- 50%) Job training(- 49%)
Health care
(+ 11%)
Health care
(+ 1%)
Family
(+ 10%)
Total 
(+ 2%)
Job training
(- 61%)
Family 
(- 50%)
Family 
(0%)
Unempl
(- 10%)
Health care
(+ 1%)
Health care 
(- 2%)
 Notes: Ranking is based on data from table 3; expenditure on the social policy categories that are ‘bold’ increased 
over time period under consideration whereas ‘bold and italics’ indicates decreased expenditure.
For all regimes, expenditure on job training and relocation assistance was expected to expand in 
face of greater openness because of the vulnerable groups’ high demands for such compensation 
and the low opposition from internationalised investors and producers to such compensation. 
The data in table 3 support this hypothesis for the conservative and social democratic regimes, 
but contradict it for the liberal regime. More speciﬁcally, the growth in expenditure on this 
social policy category is largest of all programmes between 1980 and 1998 in the conservative 
and social democratic regime whereas the liberal regime expenditure retrenches most on this 
category between 1980 and 1998 and second between 1990 and 1998. Although it goes to far to 
investigate this in this paper, these ﬁndings suggest that the materialisation of job training and 
relocation prioritisation could depend on the coordination between employer and employee-
organisations since this coordination is higher in the conservative and social democratic regimes 
than in the liberal regime. 
 Retirement assistance was expected to retrench in face of greater openness because of 
the high opposition to compensation by internationalised investors and producers and the low 
demands of vulnerable groups. However, expenditure on this welfare programme rises in all 
regimes, with the increases between 1980 and 1998 being higher than between 1990 and 1998. 
These ﬁndings could be an indication of the larger share of elderly in the population in all 
regimes and the subsequent rising expenditures. Ireland, remarkably, is the only country that 
substantially retrenched its retirement assistance. 
 Family assistance was, for the same reason as retirement assistance, expected to be 
subject to retrenchment. The evidence on this is somewhat mixed. Between 1980 and 1998, 
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all regimes hardly change: plus 2 per cent in the liberal regime (however: some retrenchment 
everywhere except in Ireland); no change in the conservative regime (Austria, France, 
Germany expansion; Belgium, Netherlands, Italy retrenchment); and 10 per cent increase 
in the social democratic regime (expansion everywhere except for Sweden). Between 1990 
and 1998, however, a different pattern arises. The liberal regime retrenches substantially (as 
do all individual countries), whilst the conservative and social democratic regimes expand 
(retrenchment in Belgium and Denmark). In the latter two regimes, family assistance is even 
spending priority number one between 1990 and 1998.   
 The hypothesized inﬂuence of openness on health-care was negative, i.e. retrenchment, 
again for the same reasons as retirement. In reality, however, all regimes expand their expenditures 
on this category between 1980 and 1998. Between 1990 and 1998, the conservative and liberal 
regimes display some expansion and although the social democratic regime decreases its 
expenditure on this welfare programme, this was only by 2 per cent. In the conservative and 
especially the social democratic regime, health-care spending has low priority whereas it has 
high priority in the liberal regime. 
 Regarding unemployment assistance, the expected outcome was indeterminate 
because of the high demand for and high opposition against expansion. The data support 
this indistinctness. The liberal regime cuts its comparatively low expenditure unemployment 
assistance substantially back (except for Ireland); the conservative regime expands its 
expenditure between 1980 and 1998 but retrenches it between 1990 and 1998 (predominantly 
caused by more individual countries retrenching, namely Austria, Belgium, France, Italy); and 
the social democratic regime expands its expenditure on unemployment assistance (except for 
Denmark), whereby in the latter the expansion is higher between 1980 and 1998 than between 
1990 and 1998. 
 In face of the three perspectives on the openness-welfare effort relationship put forward 
in the introduction, we can expect three patterns regarding total public expenditure: no change, 
expansion, or retrenchment. The data in table 3 shows that expenditure on this overarching 
category expands in all regimes in both periods. This means that if we only had looked at total 
public expenditure, the conclusion that trade openness leads to a similar increase of welfare 
effort in the various welfare state regimes would seem valid. The analysis here shows that such 
a ﬁnding would be unwarrantable and that the real patterns are more complex. Job training 
and relocation assistance is top priority in the conservative and social democratic regimes, 
as expected, but the expenditure on this category decreases in the liberal regime. Retirement 
assistance increases in all regimes, contrary to expected. Family assistance falls substantially 
in the liberal regime whilst the conservative and social democratic regimes displayed rises, 
a mixed outcome that match the expectations. Health-care expands in the conservative and 
liberal regime and is somewhat cut in the social democratic regime, contrary to the expected 
retrenchment. Finally, unemployment assistance has mixed outcomes as well with the social 
democratic regime expanding, the liberal regime retrenching and the conservative regime 
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expanding between 1980-1998 and increasing between 1990-1998. 
The differences between the regimes are clear. Nevertheless, the conservative and 
social democratic regimes are relatively close to one another. This is an interesting observation 
once we recall the resemblance between the liberal and conservative regimes in terms of trade 
openness levels. The analysis in this section additionally shows that differences are not only 
distinct between the regimes but also between the welfare programmes, indicating that a focus 
on disaggregated measures is indeed warranted. 
6 Conclusion
This paper empirically assessed to what extent the effect of trade openness varies across the 
different welfare state regimes. The presence of such variation was considered likely because 
welfare state research demonstrates that there are substantial regime-differences for example 
in the prioritization of speciﬁc welfare policies and Burgoon (2001) showed that the type of 
openness and the type of welfare policies determines if there is tension, harmony or no relation 
at all between openness and welfare effort. 
The cross-regime variation in the two types of trade openness – intra-industry trade, 
i.e. trade between developed countries, and low-wage trade, i.e. trade between developed and 
less-developed countries – indeed proved substantial. Over the entire period 1959–2000, the 
conservative regime displayed the highest level of intra-industry trade and the social democratic 
regime the lowest. Low-wage trade was, by deﬁnition, the exact mirror image of intra-industry 
trade. Because new trade theory informed us that the labour market adjustment costs such as 
the need for workers to relocate or retrain are substantially smaller under intra-industry trade 
than under low-wage trade, the different levels of these types of trade is a ﬁrst indication that 
the effect of openness varies across the welfare regimes.
Next to these different patterns of trade openness, different patterns of compensation 
politics and welfare programmes were identiﬁed. I argued that the compensation demanded 
by groups put at risks and the support for or opposition against such compensation by 
internationalised producers and investors varies across welfare programmes. More speciﬁcally, 
I expected social expenditure on job training and relocation assistance to expand; expenditure 
on health-care, retirement assistance, and family beneﬁts to retrench; and the direction of 
change in expenditure on unemployment assistance to be indeterminate. These hypotheses were 
supported to various degrees in the different welfare regimes. The relative large changes in the 
liberal regime contradicted the hypothesis of modest change, and also the relative minor changes 
in the conservative and social democratic regimes were contrary to hypothesized. However, the 
increase in expenditure on job training and relocation assistance in the conservative and social 
democratic regimes was in line with the expectations. 
In sum, there are some important conclusions to be drawn. First, there are substantial 
cross-regime differences in trade openness that should be taken into account. For example, the 
social democratic countries display the highest level of low wage trade within the EU. This 
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means that these countries – because of the higher labour market adjustment costs resulting under 
low-wage trade – are hit hardest by the entry of the new EU member-states. This also means, 
and that is the second conclusion, that we simply cannot assume – as many studies still do – that 
the effect of trade openness is similar across countries. Third, a broad operationalisation of 
welfare effort, for example total public expenditure, most probably hides important information 
and hence inhibits our understanding of contemporary welfare states. Finally, linking different 
types of trade openness, patterns of compensation politics and different welfare programmes, 
provides theoretical foundation for the intuition that the effect of trade openness on welfare 
effort varies across welfare regimes.
 
Notes
1  However, the decrease in trade openness in Norway is relatively small, especially between 1990 and 1998. 
Moreover, within the social democratic countries, Norway is the most open economy in terms of trade from 1970 
to 1990 and the second most open in 1998 (after Sweden). 
2  This difﬁcult measurement is probably one of the reasons why scholars stick to the simple ‘import plus export as 
percentage of GDP’ openness measure.
3  This argumentation draws heavily on Burgoon (2001). My contribution lies in the explicit link between this 
argumentation and the different welfare regimes.  
4  Categories 1 to 5 are operationalised following Burgoon (2001). 
5  The period 1980–1998 is chosen because the level of trade openness clearly rises between these two years (see 
table 1). The period 1990–1998 is incorporated to check if the effects are stable through time.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 Job training and relocation assistance & Retirement assistance, 1980-98
Job training and 
relocation assistance Retirement assistance
1980 1990 1998 1980 1990 1998
United Kingdom .24 .38 .18 7.67 8.75 13.42
Ireland .80 a .59 .17 5.98 5.86 4.2
United States .. .16 .1 6.85 6.59 6.9
Canada .59 a .49 .38 3.36 4.78 6.09
Average liberal regime .54 .41 .21 5.97 6.50 7.65
Austria .13 a .15 .28 4.74 4.58 14.77
Belgium  .36 a .39 .44 11.50 11.17 11.17
France .31 .46 .47 10.78 12.15 13.05
Germany .41 a .60 .56 11.92 10.89 12.0
Netherlands .14 .32 .34 12.50 13.58 9.43
Italy .13 a .11 .15 10.07 13.47 16.43
Average conservative regime .25 .34 .37 10.25 10.97 12.81
Denmark .24 .36 1.08 7.91 8.19 8.65
Finland .08 .37 .57 8.43 10.57 10.80
Norway .21 a .45 .25 7.00 9.05 9.14
Sweden .59 .77 .38 9.41 10.31 10.25
Average social democratic regime .28 .49 .57 8.19 9.53 9.71
a 1985.
b ∆ 1990-1998.
Sources:  Data for 1980 and 1990: OECD SOCX 1998; data for 1998: Source OECD Social Expenditures 
Database Public Expenditure Vol 2001; averages own calculations.
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Table A2 Family assistance & Health care, 1980-98
Family assistance Health care
1980 1990 1998 1980 1990 1998
United Kingdom 2.29 1.95 2.22 4.89 4.98 5.62
Ireland 1.14 1.53 1.74 7.10 4.86 4.66
United States .8 .44 .51 3.85 4.71 5.86
Canada .75 .7 .59 5.19 6.72 6.44
Average liberal regime 1.25 1.16 1.27 5.26 5.32 5.65
Austria 1.02 1.58 3.03 4.57 5.56 5.77
Belgium  3.12 2.36 2.22 5.49 6.66 6.13
France 2.52 2.47 2.69 5.95 6.60 7.27
Germany 2.37 1.74 2.73 6.96 6.67 7.8
Netherlands 2.63 1.73 1.21 5.92 6.05 5.97
Italy 1.10 .75 .88 5.64 6.35 5.51
Average conservative regime 2.13 1.77 2.13 5.76 6.32 6.41
Denmark 2.94 3.42 3.77 5.80 5.31 6.79
Finland 1.91 3.30 3.36 5.14 6.45 5.28
Norway 1.82 2.36 2.60 5.95 6.49 7.01 
Sweden 4.10 4.70 2.13 8.67 7.88 6.64
Average social democratic regime 2.69 3.45 2.97 6.39 6.53 6.43
Sources:  Data for 1980 and 1990: OECD SOCX 1998; data for 1998: Source OECD Social Expenditures 
Database Public Expenditure Vol 2001; averages own calculations.
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Table A3 Total public expenditure & Unemployment beneﬁts, 1980-98
Total public expenditures Unemployment beneﬁts
1980 1990 1998 1980 1990 1998
United Kingdom 18.32 19.50 24.70 1.07 .66 .32
Ireland 17.61 19.23 15.77 3.52 a 2.68 1.72
United States 13.38 13.12 14.59 .69 .39 .25
Canada 13.16 17.56 18.03 1.22 1.89 .99
Average liberal regime 15.62 17.35 18.27 1.63 1.45 .82
Austria 11.74 14.54 26.80 0.71 1.20 0.91
Belgium  24.60 25.56 24.54 2.53 2.61 2.46
France 23.47 26.66 28.82 1.31 1.87 1.80
Germany 23.71 23.20 27.29 .79 1.10 1.32
Netherlands 28.53 29.68 23.90 1.73 2.55 2.60
Italy 18.37 23.08 25.07 .60 .84 .71
Average conservative regime 21.80 23.79 26.07 1.28 1.70 1.53
Denmark 27.54 28.11 29.81 5.01 4.40 3.37
Finland 18.90 25.18 26.54 .68 1.16 2.55
Norway 18.55 26.48 26.97 .36 1.15 .49
Sweden 29.78 32.18 30.98 .39 .92 1.93
Average social democratic regime 23.69 27.99 28.58 1.61 1.91 2.09
 a 1985.
Sources:  Data for 1980 and 1990: OECD SOCX 1998; data for 1998: Source OECD Social Expenditures 
Database Public Expenditure Vol 2001; averages own calculations.
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